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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In this Essay, I propose that judicial behavior is best understood 
as a function of the incentives and constraints that particular legal 
systems place on their judges. The approach is thus an economic one, 
but it is also commonsensical, has broad empirical support, and, of 
particular relevance to this Symposium, has strong implications for 
assessing judicial performance and performance-based criteria for ju-
dicial promotion. This Essay contains no original empirical research, 
but seeks to provide a framework for interpreting and guiding em-
pirical studies of judicial behavior. 
 An immediate and important implication of the approach is that 
judicial behavior is likely to differ across national legal systems and 
indeed within a nation’s legal systems to the extent that components 
of the system (such as the different jurisdictions in the United 
States) differ in the incentives and constraints that they impose on 
judges. And still another implication is that the orthodox notion that 
judges merely interpret and apply law is unlikely to hold in all or 
even most legal systems. Another is that the criteria of judicial per-
formance are relative to the incentives and constraints that deter-
mine judicial behavior. In some judicial systems, a judge’s reversal 
rate might be a critical performance criterion, while in others more 
weight would be placed on how often a judge’s opinions were cited by 
other courts or even on the political acumen exhibited by the judge in 
his opinions. It is a mistake to suppose that one performance crite-
rion or set of such criteria should be applicable to all judges. I will 
pause from time to time in my analysis of judicial behavior to spell 
                                                                                                                     
 * Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer, the 
University of Chicago Law School. This Essay was prepared for the Florida State Univer-
sity Law Review’s symposium, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance. I thank Bryan 
Jenkins, Jonathon La Chappelle, Viktoria Lovei, Meghan Maloney, and Liss Palamkunnel 
for their very helpful research assistance and Andrei Shleifer for very helpful comments on 
a previous draft. 
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out in further detail the implications of my approach for performance 
evaluation. 
 My starting point in analyzing judicial behavior is the assump-
tion that judges, like other people, are maximizers of their utility.1 
That is, every judge has a utility function and tries to maximize the 
weighted utility of the arguments (representing preferences or de-
sires) in the function. The utility function of the average person who 
is not a judge is likely to be dominated by income, leisure, family re-
lationships, work satisfaction, and a concern for personal integrity, 
reputation, and felt achievement. The judge’s utility function is likely 
to be quite similar, but with somewhat different weights. Most people 
who seek or accept a judgeship probably derive more utility from lei-
sure and public recognition relative to income than the average prac-
ticing lawyer does; the judge is also likely to be more risk-averse, 
since judicial incomes are lower but also more stable than those of 
practicing lawyers. Since no one is forced to be a judge, and the job is 
not to everyone’s liking by any means, there is self-selection—itself 
reflecting the play of incentives and constraints on human behavior—
into the judiciary. And once selection has occurred, the incentives 
and constraints imposed by the structure and rules of the judicial ca-
reer influence the judge’s behavior—for example, by inducing a 
greater pursuit of leisure or intellectual satisfaction relative to in-
come—which in turn influences who is interested in becoming a 
judge. 
 The possible variations in incentives and constraints that could 
be brought to bear on judges are well-nigh infinite; to simplify the 
analysis, I shall analyze the behavior of judges in just a handful of 
possible configurations (incentive-constraint “packages”): private 
judges (that is, arbitrators); judges in career judiciaries such as one 
finds in most countries other than those whose legal systems derive 
ultimately from England; elected judges, such as one finds in most 
state courts in the United States; and U.S. federal trial judges, fed-
eral intermediate appellate judges (that is, federal circuit judges), 
and Supreme Court Justices. I will offer predictions based on the ra-
tional model of judicial behavior concerning the likely behavior of 
judges in these different systems and compare my predictions with 
actual, observed judicial behavior. 
II.   PRIVATE JUDGES (ARBITRATORS) 
 Arbitrators are selected by, or with the consent of, the litigants. 
An arbitrator who gets a reputation for favoring one side or the other 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 109-44 (1995) (discussing what judges 
maximize); Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 
(1980). 
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in a class of cases, such as cases of employment termination or dis-
putes between investors and brokers or between management and 
unions, will be unacceptable to one of the parties in any such dispute, 
and so the demand for his services will wither. We can expect, there-
fore, a tendency for arbitrators to “split the difference” in their 
awards, that is, to try to give each side a partial victory (and there-
fore partial defeat).2 For this will make it difficult for the parties on 
either side of the class of suits in question to infer a pattern of favor-
itism. What is more, the pattern will be attractive to risk-averse dis-
putants (because it will truncate both the upside and the downside 
risk of the dispute resolution process) and will therefore help to dif-
ferentiate arbitration from adjudication. This is important because 
arbitrators, unlike courts, are not subsidized by the government; 
their fees and expenses must be defrayed by the disputants. The pub-
lic subsidy of adjudication places them at a cost disadvantage vis-à-
vis the courts. One way to overcome this disadvantage is to offer a 
distinctive service, and splitting-the-difference decisionmaking is 
such a service. 
 Arbitration offers something else attractive to risk-averse dispu-
tants: a lower error rate than juries, because arbitrators, when they 
are not lawyers, are business people who have experience relevant to 
the case at hand. This advantage is at least partially offset, however, 
by the fact that arbitration awards cannot be appealed (presumably 
to reduce the cost of arbitration and thus reduce the cost advantage 
of the courts), though they can be challenged in court on narrow 
grounds. Because of that offset, I am inclined to stress the splitting-
the-difference character of arbitration in explaining the attractive-
ness of this substitute for adjudication as well as in elucidating the 
                                                                                                                     
 2. “[C]ourts and juries are viewed as more likely to adhere to the law and less likely 
than arbitrators to ‘split the difference’ between the two sides, thereby lowering damages 
awards for plaintiffs.” Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 693 
(Cal. 2000); see also Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 159 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest. eds., 2000); Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 114-18 (2004); Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through 
the Labyrinth: The Employers’ Paradox in Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Har-
assment—A Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1565 (1999) (finding that arbi-
trators alter “almost half” of the prior punishments in sexual harassment cases that come 
before them); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523 
(1997); Donald Wittman, Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection 
Hypothesis, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 61, 81 (2003) (“[A]rbitrators tend to split the difference 
and consequently are much more likely [than civil juries] to find a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff.”); Jane Spencer, Waiving Your Right to a Jury Trial, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2004, 
at D1. But there is some support for the belief in findings that there is less variance in ar-
bitrators’ awards than in jury awards. See Drahozal, supra, at 118. Since the lower end of 
the range of possible awards is truncated at zero, a reduction in variance is likely to reduce 
the average award. That would supply a motive for the contract party who was more likely 
to be sued than to sue for breach of contract to want an arbitration clause in the contract.  
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behavioral effects of privatizing judging, rather than to emphasize 
the more conventional differences between adjudication and arbitra-
tion. 
 Evaluating the performance of arbitrators is difficult, especially 
when, as is the common practice in commercial as distinct from labor 
arbitration, they do not write opinions. Although arbitration awards 
cannot be appealed, they can be challenged in court, on narrow 
grounds as I said; but presumably arbitrators whose awards are re-
peatedly vacated by the courts lose business, as judicial invalidation 
of the award creates added delay and expense for the parties, who, 
remember, bear the entire cost of arbitration. Also, lawyers observe 
the demeanor of the arbitrator in the hearings before him, and of 
course the outcome of the arbitration, and they form judgments, 
which they pass on to their clients, concerning the competence and 
biases (if any) of particular arbitrators. 
III.   CAREER JUDICIARIES: HEREIN OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
BUREAUCRACY 
 The career judiciaries found in countries whose legal systems do 
not have an English origin are, as the term “career judiciary” implies, 
systems manned by lawyers who make an entire career of being a 
judge.3 In contrast, most U.S. (and other Anglo-American) judges be-
come judges only after a career in some other branch of the legal pro-
fession, such as private practice, prosecution, or teaching. In the U.S. 
federal judiciary, the average age of appointment to the district court 
has, since Harry Truman’s Presidency, varied from forty-nine to fifty-
three, while that of circuit judges has varied from fifty to fifty-six.4 
Obviously a lawyer first appointed to a judgeship in his forties or fif-
ties is embarking on a second career. 
 A career judiciary is a part of the civil service. Appointment and 
promotion are by merit. Promotion is a critical feature of career judi-
ciaries because a fresh law school graduate will naturally occupy the 
                                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition 
Judiciary, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000) (comparing “career” and “recognition” 
judiciaries); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law 
Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997) (offering an empirical 
study on the incentives facing members of the Japanese judiciary—a career judiciary sys-
tem). 
 4. Albert Yoon, Love’s Labor’s Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 
1945–2000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1048 n.70 (2003). These are, I stress, averages. There is 
considerable variance on both sides. I was only forty-two when appointed (with no prior ju-
dicial experience) to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; my colleague Frank 
Easterbrook was only thirty-seven when he was appointed; and some circuit judges have 
been appointed, again with no prior judicial experience, in their sixties, though this is rare. 
Although some newly appointed or promoted federal judges have prior state or federal ju-
dicial experience (in particular, a substantial minority of federal court of appeals judges 
are promoted from the district court), most do not. 
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lowest rung of the judicial ladder when first appointed and will ex-
pect to rise to more responsible positions as he gains experience. I 
cannot see any important difference between a career judiciary and 
any other professional civil service, such as the diplomatic service or 
the armed forces. So the analysis of judicial behavior in a career judi-
ciary should be essentially the same as the analysis of bureaucratic 
behavior in general, while bureaucratic behavior, in turn, should be 
similar though not identical to the behavior of employees in a large 
business firm; and let me start with that similarity. 
 The economic difference between an employee and an entrepre-
neur, in the sense of an independent business person, is that the em-
ployee does not sell his output; rather, he rents his labor to the em-
ployer. The employer tries to value each employee’s output but rec-
ognizes that because the output of a firm is a team effort, only rough 
estimates are possible. And because of that roughness, the problem of 
agency costs arises: that is, the incentive of the employee or other 
agent to shirk if the cost to the employer of detecting some amount of 
shirking is greater than the benefit of preventing that shirking. The 
difficulty of valuing the employee’s output leads employers to adopt 
proxies for that value, such as the employee’s credentials and other 
input information, including the number of hours he works and the 
number of mistakes he makes. In general, the more costly it is to 
evaluate an employee’s output, the more inclined the employer will 
be to substitute evaluation of inputs, such as credentials, hours, and 
care. These are costly as well as imperfect substitutes, and on both 
accounts one expects some shirking to remain uncorrected; stated dif-
ferently, agency costs are unlikely to be eliminated entirely. 
 An obvious difference between a corporate and a government bu-
reaucracy is that it is much more difficult to value the latter’s output 
and therefore the value contributed by the individual bureaucrats. 
This increases agency costs, which in turn implies that the agents 
(the government bureaucrats) will have greater scope for pursuing 
their private ends than the employees of business firms. One private 
end is leisure; so one form that agency costs take in a bureaucracy as 
in a business firm is shirking. But in addition—and here we come 
upon a subtler difference between behavior in the two types of bu-
reaucracy—the ideological character of the missions of many gov-
ernment agencies, in contrast to the strictly financial character of the 
profit-maximization goal of business firms, implies that agency costs 
in a government bureaucracy will take the form not only of shirking 
but also of “sabotage.” That is, employees will have a tendency to re-
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define the agency’s mission to coincide with their personal ideological 
goals.5 
 This is certainly a tendency of a judicial bureaucracy, given the 
political and ideological significance of adjudication. But there are 
proxies for minimizing these agency costs that resemble those em-
ployed by business firms. Credentials are one: grades in law school 
are a proxy, though like most proxies a rough one, for ability to per-
form well as a judge, which is one factor in the likelihood of actually 
performing well. Although the ultimate output of a judiciary—
something that might be termed “legal justice”—is extremely difficult 
to value, the performance of a judge can be proxied by such things as 
backlog, reversal rate (consideration of which acts as a check on a 
judge’s minimizing his backlog by overly hasty decisionmaking—
more on this later6), judicial demeanor, complaints by litigants and 
lawyers, and, in a career judiciary, the quality of the judge’s rulings 
as evaluated by his superiors in the judicial bureaucracy. 
 One of the most important devices by which bureaucracies mini-
mize agency costs is by laying down detailed rules for the bureau-
crats to follow, since conformity to a rule is easier to determine than 
whether the bureaucrat is creative, innovative, imaginative, and so 
forth. Hence we expect and find that career judiciaries are found in 
legal systems that rely heavily on detailed codes rather than on the 
looser standards that are characteristic of common law systems. 
When a code sets forth a legal rule with great specificity, it is rela-
tively easy to determine whether the judge is applying the code cor-
rectly; judicial agency costs are therefore minimized. 
 A career judiciary can be expected to be methodologically conser-
vative and therefore unadventurous. Promotion in a career judiciary 
as in any other branch of the civil service depends ultimately on one’s 
ability to perform to the satisfaction of one’s superiors, and it is diffi-
cult to see how the supervisors in a career judiciary will benefit in 
their own careers from having bold, experimentally minded subordi-
nates. It is not like a business firm, in which a division head’s hard-
driving, innovative subordinates may produce increases in revenues 
and profits that will redound to his credit for having selected and en-
couraged those subordinates. Thus, we can expect the output of a ca-
reer judiciary to display low variance, to be of uniformly professional 
                                                                                                                     
 5. See, e.g., JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: 
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC (1997); Lael R. Keiser, The Determi-
nation of Street-Level Bureaucratic Behavior: Gate-Keeping in the Social Security Disabil-
ity Program (unpublished manuscript, presented at the National Public Management Re-
search Conference, Georgetown University, Oct. 9-11, 2003), available at 
http://www.pmranet.org/conferences/georgetownpapers/keiser.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 
2005). 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 16-18.  
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quality, but to be uncreative.7 It is no surprise that legal academics 
in nations that have career judiciaries are treated not merely as 
commentators on the law, as in Anglo-American legal systems, but as 
sources of law; the judges are unwilling to play such a role. With the 
structure of the judicial career and the heavy reliance placed on legal 
codes and treatise writers as sources of law, performance criteria 
that emphasized intellectual creativity and independence, political 
acumen, or even pragmatic insights into “law in action” would be 
misplaced. A judge who excelled in such dimensions would be step-
ping out of his designated role. 
IV.   PROMOTION PROSPECTS: CAREER VERSUS LATERAL-ENTRY 
JUDICIARIES 
 I have emphasized the role of promotion in constraining the be-
havior of judges in career judiciaries. In contrast, promotion is of lim-
ited significance in an Anglo-American-style lateral-entry judiciary. 
Most judges are not promoted at all, partly because judges tend to be 
appointed at a relatively advanced age, partly because there are very 
few rungs in the judicial ladder in most Anglo-American judiciaries, 
and partly because previous judicial experience is not required for 
appointment to even the highest rung. For example, although in the 
U.S. federal court system a significant fraction of intermediate appel-
late judges are appointed from the trial bench, most are not; and be-
cause there are many fewer appellate than trial judges, the great ma-
jority of district judges are not promoted.8 What is more, the salary 
and prestige differences between district and circuit judges are small, 
though the workload is lighter in the appellate court. And while at 
present almost all the Supreme Court Justices were federal circuit 
judges previously, there are so few Justices, and they serve for such a 
long time, that the percentage of federal court of appeals judges who 
                                                                                                                     
 7. John Henry Merryman has noted that the civil law judge is  
a kind of expert clerk. He is presented with a fact situation to which a ready 
legislative response will be readily found in all except the extraordinary case. 
His function is merely to find the right legislative provision, couple it with the 
fact situation, and bless the solution that is more or less automatically pro-
duced from the union. The whole process of judicial decision is made to fit into 
the formal syllogism of scholastic logic. The major premise is in the statute, the 
facts of the case furnish the minor premise, and the conclusion inevitably fol-
lows.  
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36 (2d ed. 1985); see also Georgakopou-
los, supra note 3, at 212 (noting that incentives faced by members of a career judiciary tend 
to discourage innovation); John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 109, 116 (1996) (discussing these effects as found in the French judiciary). 
 8. See Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
455, 461 (1999) (“[T]he probability that a district court judge serving during the 1990s 
would be promoted to the court of appeals was only six percent.”). 
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becomes Supreme Court Justices is minuscule. Furthermore, while 
merit is not completely irrelevant to promotion in the federal court 
system (even promotion to the Supreme Court,9 where political crite-
ria dominate), it is not the dominant factor. In particular, the higher 
judges do not decide who among the lower judges shall be promoted. 
The result of all these factors is that promotion prospects cannot be 
expected to play a significant constraining effect on the behavior of 
American judges, in sharp contrast to the situation in a career judici-
ary. We must look elsewhere for the constraints. 
V.   ELECTED STATE JUDGES 
 The elected judiciaries of the U.S. states—and most of the states 
use some form of election to choose all or most of their judges—
provide a striking contrast to the foreign career judiciaries. An 
elected judge is subject to constraints that have only attenuated 
counterparts in other types of judiciary. The first and most obvious is 
that, provided he is elected for only a limited term and therefore 
must stand for reelection, he is subject, as a tenured federal judge is 
not, to a form of performance review. 
 Second, and closely related, the elected judge has to be more sen-
sitive to public opinion than a judge whose tenure does not depend on 
the whim of the electorate. Only a handful of cases, primarily those 
involving notorious crimes, will interest a significant portion of the 
electorate, but in those cases we can expect a systematic bias to creep 
in. For example, because only the most egregious murders are eligi-
ble for capital punishment, judges in a state that has capital pun-
ishment may tilt against capital defendants.10 In addition, we can ex-
pect elected judges to tilt more than appointed ones in favor of a liti-
gant who is a resident of the judge’s state when the opposing party is 
a nonresident.11 
 What this means is that the evaluation of judicial performance in 
a system of elected judges is likely to be far different from that in a 
career judiciary. The electorate and one’s judicial superiors are very 
different types of performance evaluators with respect both to knowl-
edge and to the criteria employed in the evaluation. Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145 (2005). 
 10. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding 
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 792-
96 (1995). Consistent with this conjecture, the shorter the average term of judges in a 
state, the more likely they are to impose the death penalty. Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann 
Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and Rules in the Politics of Judicial 
Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206, 1219-21, 1223 (1997). 
 11. For evidence, see Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political 
Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157 (1999). 
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and notwithstanding all the criticisms that are made of judicial elec-
tion, having to stand for reelection must have some effect in keeping 
judges on their toes, and there is no corresponding stick in the case of 
U.S. federal judges. 
 Third, the judge has to be able to raise money to conduct his elec-
toral campaign, and the primary donors to judicial election cam-
paigns are the lawyers who litigate in the judge’s court. If the law-
yers on both sides in the principal practice areas—such as lawyers 
for medical malpractice patients and lawyers for medical malpractice 
defendants—gave equal amounts of money to judicial candidates, the 
situation would be much like that regarding arbitrators: the judge 
would have an incentive to steer a middle course in his rulings in 
such cases. But in fact the stakes in particular practice areas are of-
ten systematically asymmetrical, and in that event an elected judici-
ary is likely to display a systematic bias. 
 Putting these points together, we can see that elected judges are 
less independent politically than appointed ones, especially ap-
pointed judges with lifetime tenure.12 Yet this is not necessarily a bad 
thing, not only because of the spur to effort that not having tenure 
can impart, but also because the decisions of elected judges tend to be 
more predictable than those of appointed judges.13 This is consistent 
with, maybe even entailed by, the fact that elected judges are less in-
dependent; the independent judge is likely to have a more complex 
decision calculus, since he cannot just put his finger to the political 
wind. And as long as the populist element in adjudication does not 
swell to the point where unpopular though innocent people are con-
victed of crimes or other gross departures from the rule of law occur, 
conforming judicial policies to democratic preference can be regarded 
as a good thing in a society that prides itself on being the world’s 
leading democracy. 
 This point underscores the intimate relation between judicial be-
havior and judicial performance. If (and maybe it is a big if) one takes 
the existence of an elective judiciary to signify a legitimate democ-
ratic preference for aligning judicial and popular attitudes more 
closely than in a nonelective system, then a judge who defies public 
opinion is not only a judge unlikely to be reelected; he is, it can be ar-
gued, however paradoxically, a bad, even a usurpative, judge. The 
other side of this coin, however, is that the more uniform is public 
opinion, the more important judicial independence is in safeguarding 
                                                                                                                     
 12. For additional evidence, see Brace & Hall, supra note 10. See also F. Andrew 
Hanssen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94 AM. ECON. 
REV. 712, 717 (2004) (providing references). 
 13. See F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the 
Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 
205, 231-32 (1999) (suggesting that greater uncertainty is a cost of judicial independence). 
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minority rights. Thus Andrew Hanssen finds that judicial independ-
ence is most likely to be valued where political competition is intense, 
because “[b]y establishing an independent court, politicians currently 
in office make it more difficult for successors to alter the policies 
passed today.”14 
 Oddly, although an elective judiciary is more democratic than an 
appointive one in the Anglo-American setting, it is not more democ-
ratic than a career judiciary in legal systems that do not have an An-
glo-American origin. When legislative codes are detailed and judges 
are formalists in the sense of enforcing the codes as written rather 
than using them as merely the starting point for the development of 
legal standards, the democratic legislature is calling the legal tune 
and the judges really are just executing decisions made by democratic 
process. 
 A further, and I think clearly adverse, effect of an elective judici-
ary is that it limits the field of selection. Most people are tempera-
mentally unsuited for electoral politics and in any event are not good 
at it, though they may have just the suite of abilities required in an 
excellent judge. The number of people who have both political and 
judicial talent (and taste—a judicial career is likely to attract risk 
averters, and a political career risk takers) is probably very small, 
and there may even be a degree of incompatibility between the two 
kinds of talent. The list of failed politicians who went on to become 
fine judges is, I believe, longer than the list of successful politicians 
who became fine judges, though I have not been able to document 
this point.15 But assuming it is correct, we can expect that other 
things being equal, an elective judiciary will be less able than an ap-
pointive one16—unless, to repeat a previous point, conformity to popu-
lar opinion is deemed a plus rather than a minus in a judge. Of 
course, other things may not be equal; in particular, lifetime tenure 
may, as I suggested earlier, have a debilitating effect on effort. The 
other side of this coin, however, is that lifetime tenure is a highly 
valuable asset, which increases the real income of federal judges 
relative to state judges and so contributes to making a federal judge-
ship more coveted, broadening the field of selection. 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Hanssen, supra note 12, at 726; see also J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling 
(In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994). 
 15. All that is clear—and surprising—is that in a large sample of federal judges, forty 
percent had held some kind of political office before becoming a judge, and twenty-seven 
percent of those (so roughly ten percent of the total) had held elected office. Judges’ Opin-
ions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least 
Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 755-56 tbl.9.1 (1989).  
 16. For evidence, see Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democ-
ratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345 (1984). 
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VI.   FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 
 Thus far in my analysis the question of judicial behavior has not 
presented many mysteries. The incentives and constraints facing 
judges in the systems that I have been discussing are generally 
rather similar to those playing on more conventional economic actors. 
The picture changes when we turn to the appointed, life-tenured trial 
judges of the U.S. federal judiciary. For the typical district judge, as I 
pointed out earlier, the appointment is terminal: the judge is unlikely 
to be promoted and therefore unlikely to be constrained in his rulings 
by desire for promotion. He is also unlikely to resign and go into the 
practice of law or into some other line of work, even after reaching re-
tirement age; most federal judges prefer to take senior status then, 
which allows them to judge part-time yet receive their full salary. 
And only criminal or other egregious misconduct or incapacity will 
get the judge removed involuntarily. Moreover, not only is the judi-
cial salary the same for all district judges—there are no bonuses for 
outstanding performance—but a judge’s ability to cash in on his judi-
cial reputation by moonlighting as a teacher or lecturer is very lim-
ited, as there are strict, low caps on outside earned income, other 
than book royalties. It seems, then, that the federal judicial career 
has been carefully designed to insulate the judges from the normal 
incentives and constraints that determine the behavior of rational ac-
tors, except for the relative handful of judges who are ambitious for 
promotion to the court of appeals; and I shall ignore them. So it is as 
if the federal judicial career had been configured to perplex econo-
mists! 
 The mystery is at the practical rather than the theoretical level. 
Most decisions that a person makes have no greater impact on his 
utility than the decision of a judge has on the judge’s utility. A person 
faced with a choice between two nearly identical items on a menu, 
such as a choice between two flavors of ice cream, cannot base the 
choice on the effect on his income or job security, yet his choice will 
be rational: it will be the choice that generates a larger net increment 
in his utility. But it may be very difficult to figure out why that par-
ticular choice is the one that has that consequence. And so it is with 
judges. The decision of a federal district judge will not affect his in-
come or job security, but it will affect his utility in some other way—
the question is in what way. The difference between this and the ice 
cream case is that the effect of the judicial decision on the judge’s 
utility cannot be reduced to a single dimension, such as taste. Decid-
ing a particular case in a particular way might increase the judge’s 
utility just by the satisfaction that doing a good job produces, which 
is what we would like. But it might also do so by advancing a political 
or ideological goal, economizing on the judge’s time and effort, invit-
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ing commendation from people whom the judge admires, benefiting 
the local community, getting the judge’s name in the newspaper, 
pleasing a spouse or other family member or a friend, galling a law-
yer whom the judge dislikes, expressing affection for or hostility to-
ward one of the parties—and the list goes on and on.  
 Not only is there no effective mechanism for punishing a judge 
who yields to such temptations; that he has yielded can in most cases 
not even be detected. A judge’s broad discretion in managing the tim-
ing and scope of the litigation before him, in ruling on objections to 
evidence, and in resolving factual disputes enables him often to so in-
fluence the factual premises of the decision that it will appear to pro-
ceed ineluctably from the facts. The process by which some facts are 
highlighted and others ignored or given little weight need not reflect 
a conscious endeavor to make the judge look good and reduce the 
likelihood of reversal. It may simply be the consequence of uncer-
tainty opening the way to bias. If an arresting officer says one thing 
and the person he arrested says something else, the judge’s decision 
as to which one to believe is likely to be influenced, sometimes deci-
sively, by the judge’s background (was he a prosecutor before he be-
came a judge? a defense lawyer?). Similarly, if one thinks back to the 
extraordinary variance in federal sentences that prevailed before the 
promulgation of the federal sentencing guidelines, one will find it dif-
ficult to resist the inference that the most important considerations 
in fixing a defendant’s sentence within the limits permitted by law 
had nothing to do with legal analysis but everything to do with the 
judge’s attitudes toward personal responsibility and toward the de-
terrent effect of criminal punishment. 
 An employer who cannot evaluate an employee’s output directly 
will, as I noted earlier, tend to base hiring, salary, promotion, and fir-
ing decisions on observable inputs instead, that is, on ex ante signals 
of quality. So one expects—and finds—that the more secure the ten-
ure of the judges in a particular legal system, and hence the more dif-
ficult it is to control their behavior, the more careful will be the 
screening for the job by the appointing authorities; there will also be 
more competition for it, which will widen the field of selection and 
generate greater information for those authorities. Assuming that 
people have generally stable preferences and that behavior has a 
strong habitual element, the older a person is when he is appointed 
to a job, the more predictable his performance in it will be. A lawyer 
who has performed successfully for many years in practice, demon-
strating qualities of sobriety, good judgment, integrity, and other at-
tributes that are important in a judge, will probably continue to dis-
play those qualities when the carrots and sticks of a legal practice are 
withdrawn. It is like firing a gun: the position and rifling of the gun’s 
barrel impart direction to the bullet, but momentum takes over in 
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guiding the bullet once it leaves the barrel, though wind or other en-
vironmental disturbances may deflect it from its initial path. In 
much the same way, psychological momentum may cause a judge to 
behave consistently with his previous behavior as a practicing lawyer 
or prosecutor or professor even though he is freer in his judicial posi-
tion from financial incentives and constraints than in his prior posi-
tions. 
 Moreover, the fact I have been stressing—that when gross incen-
tives and constraints are removed, a space is created for ones nor-
mally of only minor significance to determine the individual’s behav-
ior—has an upside as well as a downside so far as conforming judicial 
behavior to social norms is concerned. People care about their reputa-
tion apart from purely instrumental effects; that is why rank order-
ings and prizes have psychological effects distinct from any career ef-
fects of being singled out from one’s fellows. For example, federal dis-
trict judges are sensitive to the quarterly statistics compiled by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts showing how many cases the 
judge has had under advisement for more than a specified length of 
time—so sensitive that judges will sometimes dismiss cases at the 
end of a reporting period, with leave to reinstate the case at the be-
ginning of the next reporting period, in order to improve their statis-
tics. Judges also do not like to be reversed,17 even though a reversal 
has no tangible effect on a judge’s career if he is unlikely to be pro-
moted to the court of appeals in any event.18 Because judges are sen-
sitive both to backlog and to reversal—neither allowing their backlog 
to grow to inordinate length merely to reduce the probability of re-
versal nor allowing their reversal rate to soar merely to eliminate 
their backlog by making precipitate rulings—they are constrained to 
exercise a kind of care that is analogous to that of judges in a career 
judiciary. 
 This is a neglected point, so let me elaborate on it a bit. District 
court judges have heavy dockets; a judge might well have 500 cases 
pending before him. Most of these will settle or be abandoned without 
judicial intervention; but enough will remain that require court ac-
tion to induce the judge to attend to them, lest his backlog become 
completely unmanageable. And yet he cannot be completely summary 
in disposing of these cases because then his reversal rate will rise to 
an embarrassing level. So backlog pressure keeps him working hard, 
and reversal threat keeps him working carefully. 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of In-
ferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1994) (explaining why judges do not 
like to be reversed on appeal); Higgins & Rubin, supra note 1, at 130;  William J. Stuntz, 
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 541 (2001). 
 18. In addition, Higgins and Rubin found that reversal rate has no effect on a judge’s 
chances of promotion. Higgins & Rubin, supra note 1, at 135-36. 
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 But the result is a band, not a point; within the band the judge 
has discretion—greater discretion than that enjoyed by judges in ca-
reer judiciaries. Therefore, one expects that personal factors—such as 
political or ideological concerns personal to the judge rather than 
embodied in the law, the kind of intellectual laziness that consists of 
acting on intuition rather than on analysis and evidence, and the de-
lights of tormenting the lawyers that appear before them19—will play 
a larger role in federal district judges’ decisions than they play in the 
decisions of their counterparts in career judiciaries. Tormenting the 
lawyers perhaps especially plays a larger role because it neither af-
fects the judge’s reversal rate nor increases his backlog; on the con-
trary, it will reduce his backlog by inducing more settlements. In 
short, judicial agency costs—the costs of controlling judicial behav-
ior—are higher in a system in which judges have secure tenure and 
identical salaries than in one in which their careers depend on their 
ability to satisfy their superiors’ expectations. When agency costs are 
higher, the agent has more discretion to pursue his own goals 
whether or not they coincide with his principal’s goals. 
 It is important to distinguish, however, between judicial agency 
costs and political judging. The many studies which confirm—what 
everybody knows but orthodox legal thinkers are loath to acknowl-
edge—that the political party of the appointing President is a good 
predictor of a judge’s votes in a wide variety of cases20 shows nothing 
more than that there is a large open area in American law, that is, an 
area in which conventional legal materials do not dictate the outcome 
and the judge is forced to make a policy judgment, inevitably influ-
enced by political or ideological preferences. The judge may still be a 
faithful agent of the President who appointed him or, to the extent 
that political preferences (not partisan preferences but preferences 
concerning public policy) are legitimate tools of adjudication, of “the 
law.” The problem of agency costs arises only when the looseness of 
the principal’s control over the judge enables the latter to make deci-
sions driven by a preference that is too personal, partisan, or idiosyn-
cratic, to be legitimate. 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 2D. 11 (2001). 
 20. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 294 
tbl.10.1 (5th ed. 2001); C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 24-57 (1996). This of course is true of American judges in gen-
eral, not just of federal district judges. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regula-
tion, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein et al., 
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 301 (2004). However, in a large sample of civil rights cases at the district court level, 
Orley Ashenfelter and his colleagues found some effect of race and gender but none of the 
political party of the appointing President. Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judi-
ciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 
(1995). For a useful review of the literature, see Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judi-
cial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999). 
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 Similarly, the fact that judicial decisions are sometimes influ-
enced by the race, religion, gender, or other personal characteristics 
of the judge21 need not be an effect of agency costs, but may merely 
reflect the fact that people from different backgrounds are likely to 
bring different priors to their resolution of factual issues and to have 
different policy preferences because of differences in life experiences. 
VII.   FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGES 
 The analysis of federal circuit judges is broadly similar to that of 
district judges but with four main differences. First, the dual con-
straints imposed by backlog pressure and reversal threat are attenu-
ated. The caseloads of circuit judges are lighter than those of district 
judges, so the threat of an unmanageable caseload looms less omi-
nously; moreover, once a case has been argued to the appeals panel, 
there will be no further activity in the case until it is decided, which 
means that the size of the backlog does not affect the workload of the 
appellate judge, as it does of the district judge. And so few court of 
appeals decisions are reviewed by the Supreme Court that the threat 
of reversal cannot operate as a significant constraint on circuit 
judges’ decisions—and for the additional reason that many reversals 
by the Supreme Court reflect ideological differences rather than error 
correction (and therefore explicit or implicit criticism); this is less 
true of reversals of district judges. 
 Second, because appellate judges sit in panels rather than by 
themselves, there is a premium placed on cooperative behavior; the 
downside is the risk of factions and (though I believe this is quite 
rare in the federal judiciary) of log rolling (that is, vote trading). 
 Third, appellate judges have a greater opportunity to influence 
the direction of the law, on the model most famously of Learned 
Hand, than trial judges do. One reason for this greater opportunity—
apart from the obvious one that appellate adjudication focuses far 
more than at the trial level on general issues of law rather than on 
factual or procedural issues specific to the particular case—is that, as 
I have just noted, the Supreme Court reviews only a minute percent-
age (currently less than one percent) of court of appeals decisions. 
Entire fields of law are left mainly to the courts of appeals to shape. 
Many court of appeals judges are not ambitious enough to influence 
the direction in which the law will evolve or to acquire the kind of 
reputation that court of appeals judges like Learned Hand and Henry 
Friendly acquired; and because the risk of reversal is so much lower, 
                                                                                                                     
 21. See, e.g., Gerard S. Gryski et al., Models of State High Court Decision Making in 
Sex Discrimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143 (1986); Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L. Britt, 
Judges’ Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black Judges Sentence Differently?, 82 
SOC. SCI. Q. 749 (2001).  
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and the reward for creative legal thinking greater, at the court of ap-
peals than at the district court, we can expect these judges to weight 
leisure more heavily, and to vote their personal preferences more of-
ten than district judges do. Like trial judges, and indeed more easily, 
appellate judges can conceal the role of personal preferences in their 
decisions by stating the facts selectively so that the outcome seems to 
follow inevitably or by taking liberties with precedents. 
 As for the minority of ambitious appellate judges (their ambition 
manifested for example in their often fierce competition to obtain the 
ablest law clerks22), the principal constraint is stare decisis, that is, 
the practice of adhering to precedent. In a rational-actor analysis, the 
constraining effect of precedent comes not from the fact that stare de-
cisis is a sound policy but from the fact that a judge’s influence is de-
pendent to a significant degree on his decisions being treated as 
precedent by other judges. If he is cavalier about adhering to prece-
dent in his own decisions, he undermines the practice of stare decisis 
in general and the likelihood that his own decisions will be followed 
by other judges in particular. 
 Another, though overlapping, minority of court of appeals judges 
should be mentioned: those who by reason of prominence, political 
connections, race or ethnicity, or other factors have a real shot at be-
ing appointed to the Supreme Court. With very rare exceptions, the 
probability that a given court of appeals judge, however well placed 
he seems in the competition to be appointed to the Supreme Court, 
will actually be appointed is low; but if the judge attaches enormous 
value to being a Supreme Court Justice, the expected utility of such 
an appointment (most simply, the utility of the appointment multi-
plied by its probability) may influence behavior. Thus, a study found 
that after Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court failed, in 
part because of his extrajudicial writings (the largest component of 
the “paper trail” that did him in), the publication rate of court of ap-
peals judges, after adjustment for other factors, declined precipi-
tately.23 
 A fourth factor that differentiates circuit from district judges 
builds on the earlier suggestion (fundamental to this Essay) that 
when gross incentives and constraints on behavior are removed, 
smaller ones can be expected to have a decisive effect. It is that pro-
fessional criticism of judicial decisions can be expected to place some 
limitations on the exercise of judicial discretion and more so at the 
appellate than at the trial level. The principal product of appellate 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See Christopher Avery et al., The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 793 (2001). 
 23. S. Scott Gaille, Publishing by United States Court of Appeals Judges: Before and 
After the Bork Hearings, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 375-76 (1997). 
2005]                          AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 1275 
 
judges is the judicial opinion, and judicial opinions are self-contained 
(or at least self-contained-appearing) texts readily accessible to pro-
fessional critique. However, present-day professional criticism of ju-
dicial opinions is so heavily discounted by most judges as to have lit-
tle influence on their behavior, and thus it fails as an effective con-
straint on judicial discretion. 
 The reasons for this discounting are threefold. There is first a 
sense among judges that academics and practicing lawyers alike 
simply do not understand the conditions under which judges work 
and that much of their criticism of judicial performance is therefore 
captious, obtuse, and unconstructive. Second, rather than being dis-
interested, a great deal of the current professional criticism of judi-
cial opinions reflects either client interests (in the case of criticism by 
practicing lawyers, even when expressed in books or articles) or, in 
the case of academic criticism, the politics of the professor. Third, and 
related to the second point, critique of judicial opinions emphasizes 
opinions of the Supreme Court to the virtual exclusion, or so it seems, 
of opinions of the lower courts, even though those opinions vastly 
outnumber Supreme Court opinions. Of course, treatises and law re-
view articles dealing with areas of the law in which the Court is not 
active are perforce concerned with the work of the lower federal 
courts. But there is a great difference, so far as professional criticism 
as an influence on judicial behavior is concerned, between citing a ju-
dicial opinion for some proposition and analyzing the opinion in 
depth. 
 The relation of the third point to the second lies in the fact that to 
a great extent the Supreme Court—especially in its constitutional 
decisions—which are the particular focus of critique—is a political 
court, so that the critique of its work is also to a great extent un-
avoidably political, creating the impression that the nation’s law fac-
ulties have become increasingly politicized. 
 The fact that conventional professional criticism of judicial opin-
ions is faltering badly as a constraint on the behavior of federal cir-
cuit judges makes the development of quantitative criteria of judicial 
performance, which have received emphasis in this Symposium, a 
welcome one. Such criteria are less likely than the conventional ver-
bal standards applied to judicial performance to be dismissed as po-
litical and are also more economical because statistics can compact a 
vast amount of information, as discursive critique cannot. But five 
caveats are in order. 
 First, judicial performance criteria should not be uniform across 
courts and judges; such criteria as backlog and reversal rate should, 
for reasons indicated earlier, play a larger role in the evaluation of 
district judges than of circuit judges. 
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 Second, as explained below, even first-rate performance criteria 
may not be useful for determining whether a judge should be pro-
moted. 
 Third, as with any numerical ranking system there is a danger 
that the competitors will be able to “game” it. 
 Fourth, as illustrated by the performance criteria for circuit 
judges that have received the most attention, such as out-of-circuit 
citations24 or the more inclusive quantitative ranking scheme devel-
oped and applied by Choi and Gulati,25 the choice of criteria depends 
on assumptions about the incentives and constraints that operate on 
circuit judges. The criteria just mentioned measure influence and 
prominence (for example, one of Choi and Gulati’s performance crite-
ria is the number of times a judge is mentioned by name,26 and in an-
other study Gulati and Sanchez rank judges by the number of their 
opinions published in casebooks27), implicitly treating judicial creativ-
ity as a desirable characteristic of circuit judges. Not everyone will 
agree; and it would be a particularly dubious assumption to apply to 
career judges and, to a lesser extent, to any trial judges and any 
elected judges, as well. 
 And fifth, as critics of the U.S. News and World Report’s ranking 
of colleges and law schools are well aware, numerical rankings are 
questionable when the rankings are multidimensional, so that the 
weighting of the different dimensions becomes critical to the rank-
ings. Those weightings tend to be arbitrary. The problem is particu-
larly serious with respect to the ranking of judges, because there is 
no agreement on what are the most important aspects of judicial per-
formance. If you happen to think that lucidity is an extraordinarily 
important virtue of a judicial opinion, this will affect your weighting 
relative to someone who thinks that explaining carefully to the losing 
party why he lost, or discussing even minor issues, or stating the 
facts in comprehensive detail, is a more important virtue in a judicial 
opinion. 
 I should note that Choi and Gulati do not use reversal rate as a 
performance criterion for circuit judges. That may seem a surprising 
                                                                                                                     
 24. For the most complete study, see William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A 
Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998). 
 25. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & 
Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice]; see also Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A 
Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tourna-
ment of Judges]. 
 26. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice, supra note 25, at 59; see 
also David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1999). 
 27. Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the Su-
perstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141 (2002). 
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omission. However, reversal rate and creativity are likely to be posi-
tively correlated, since a judge who is creating precedents rather 
than just following them can be expected to be reversed more often 
than the unadventurous judge.28 (The analogy is to the fact that 
home-run hitters tend to strike out more often than singles hitters.) 
Moreover, the effect of reversals is captured automatically in one of 
the performance criteria that Choi and Gulati emphasize—frequency 
of citation to a judge—because a decision that is reversed is highly 
unlikely to be cited. 
VIII.   THE SUPREME COURT 
 When we turn to the U.S. Supreme Court, the picture changes 
once again. Reversal risk falls to zero, but there is still a constraining 
effect from stare decisis and the possibility of political retribution in 
the form of legislation (in the case of statutory decisions) or constitu-
tional amendments (in the case of constitutional decisions) nullifying 
an unpopular decision;29 political retribution can also take the form of 
low-level harassment by congressional budget committees,30 and can 
come from the prospect of the appointment of new Justices, when va-
cancies arise, who will be unsympathetic to the existing ones. Indeed, 
because of the high visibility of the Court’s decisions, the political 
constraints operating on the Justices are probably greater than those 
that operate at lower levels of the federal judiciary. But the combina-
tion of those constraints with the lack of guidance that conventional 
legal materials provide in truly novel cases, which bulk dispropor-
tionately large in the Court’s docket, makes the Supreme Court im-
portantly a political body31—much more so than the lower federal 
courts—so that analysis of the behavior of the Justices should paral-
lel that of the behavior of conventional political actors, as is fre-
quently argued.32 Yet they cannot be evaluated entirely by that stan-
                                                                                                                     
 28. See Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-
Making, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31 (1994). 
 29. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory In-
terpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (discussing and providing empirical evi-
dence on Congress’s role in overriding Supreme Court statutory decisions and the extent to 
which these practices affect Supreme Court decisionmaking). For a more skeptical view of 
the importance and existence of these effects, see Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Stra-
tegic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1451-
59 (2001). 
 30. Eugenia F. Toma, A Contractual Model of the Voting Behavior of the Supreme 
Court: The Role of the Chief Justice, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 433 (1996). 
 31. For excellent discussions, see MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE 
SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1964); and Richard 
Hodder-Williams, Six Notions of ‘Political’ and the United States Supreme Court, 22 BRIT. 
J. POL. SCI. 1 (1992). 
 32. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). 
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dard, because a rational Justice will give weight to precedent.33 The 
political character of the Court demonstrates that the criticism of a 
Supreme Court Justice for having political smarts34 is not valid; and 
indeed it is a legitimate criticism of the current Court that the aggre-
gate political experience of its members is slight by historical stan-
dards. 
 This analysis supports Steven Goldberg’s criticism of Choi and 
Gulati’s proposal35 that Supreme Court Justices be chosen by a 
“tournament” of federal court of appeals judges.36 Just as the best ap-
pellate judge in a Continental judiciary might very well not be the 
best choice for a U.S. court of appeals, so a court of appeals judge 
might very well not be the best choice for the U.S. Supreme Court.37 
One must always beware the “Peter Principle”: the tendency to pro-
mote a person beyond the level of his competence as a reward for 
competent performance at the next lower level. 
 The best way to study the tournament proposal, begun by James 
Brudney in his essay for this Symposium,38 is to apply Choi and Gu-
lati’s criteria to the federal court of appeals judges who have become 
Supreme Court Justices and see whether the criteria are predictive of 
the judges’ performance as Justices. (Their criteria can easily be ex-
tended to judges of other courts, to bring Holmes, Cardozo, O’Connor, 
and others who came to the Court from state judgeships into the pic-
ture.39) Of course this would require developing good performance 
measures for Supreme Court Justices. 
IX.   CONCLUSION 
 Difficult as the question of judicial behavior may appear to be 
from the standpoint of rational-actor analysis, a careful consideration 
of the incentives and constraints that operate on judges in different 
types of judicial systems and a careful exploration of analogies be-
tween judges and other economic actors, such as conventional bu-
reaucrats and elected officials, may supply satisfactory answers, or at 
                                                                                                                     
 33. For evidence, see Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Jus-
tices’ Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (2000). 
 34. Justice O’Connor is widely regarded as the most politically astute of the current 
Justices.  
 35. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament of Judges, supra note 25. 
 36. Steven Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1237 (2005). 
 37. For other reservations concerning the adequacy of Choi and Gulati’s methodology 
for selecting Supreme Court Justices, see Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Selection and 
Measures of Past Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1175 (2005). 
 38. James J. Brudney, Foreseeing Greatness? Measurable Performance Criteria and 
the Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1015 (2005). 
 39. For example, in my book, RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 
(1990), I used out-of-state citations, as well as other numerical criteria, in an effort to de-
termine Cardozo’s standing among state judges. Id. at 74-91 & 85 tbl.5. 
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least establish a framework for further research. The analysis can, 
moreover, be extended to other judicial personnel, including law 
clerks and magistrate and bankruptcy judges, who operate under dif-
ferent incentives and constraints from those operating on the types of 
judges discussed in this Essay. And the better the behavior of judicial 
personnel is understood, the greater the feasibility of developing 
sound criteria of judicial performance. 
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